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WOMEN PRISONERS: FREEDOM FROM 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT-A 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
In terms of sexual harassment inside it certainly 
happens often and consistently. That's why 
women inside often put forth the demand for all 
female guards. The harassment occurs on many 
levels-from a guard walking in on a woman un-
dressing (that happens regularly), to sexual at-
tacks by guards and staff. Any prisoner would say 
there's sexual harassment inside (if she wasn't 
afraid of repercussions, that is.p 
Sexual harassment2 of female inmates by male guards per-
meates American prisons because the imbalance of power be-
tween the guard and the prisoner allows and encourages it to 
exist.s Sexual harassment in prison is not a series of isolated in-
cidents;· rather, it is so much a part of the power structure that 
it is almost invisible. II 
Women prisoners are forced to endure invasions of their 
1. Letter from Stephanie Erickson, writer for THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, to Lau-
rie Hanson (Sept. 6, 1982). (THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS is a women's and children's 
prison newsletter published by a prisoner rights' group in Seattle, Washington). 
2. Sexual harassment is "any unwanted sexual attention a woman experiences ... 
ranging from leering, pinching, patting, verbal comments, and subtle pressure for sexual 
activity, to attempted rape and rape." ALLI.'NCE AGAINST SEXUAL COERCION, FIGHTING 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ALLIANCE AGAINST SEXUAL COERCION] 
(ALLIANCE AGAINST SEXUAL COERCION was formed in Boston to work against sexual har-
assment in the workplace). 
3. Id. at 7. All literature on the subject deals with sexual harrassment in the market 
place. As the imbalance of power in prison is more marked than on the outside, all statis-
tics and analyses are used by analogy. See also, C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF 
WORKING WOMEN 1-23, 156-58, 174-82 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MACKINNON] for an 
excellent discussion of male dominance over women as the background for sexual harass-
ment. The author also discusses occupational segregation and income inequality which 
are forms of sexual harassment in and of themselves. "[S]exual harassment of women 
can occur largely because women occupy inferior job positions and job roles; at the same 
time, sexual harassment works to keep women in such positions. Sexual harassment, 
then, uses and helps create women's structurally inferior status." Id. at 9-10. 
4. ALLIANCE AGAINST SEXUAL COERCION, supra note 2, at 10. In 1976, Redbook Mag-
azine conducted a survey in which 88% of the 9,000 respondents reported that they had 
experienced one or more forms of sexual harassment on the job. Id. at 10. 
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bodily privacy ranging from being viewed in the nude6 to being 
forced to submit to body cavity and pat searches in the presence 
of, and in emergencies by, male guards.' At times they engage in 
"voluntary"8 relations with the guards-bartering sex for psy-
chological and physical freedom. 9 If a staff member requests sex-
6. See, e.g., Forts v. Ward, 434 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 
566 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1977), on remand, 471 F. Supp. 1095 (1978), vacated in part, 621 
F.2d 1210 (1980) (inmates brought suit alleging invasion of privacy due to presence of 
male guards in living quarters and infirmary). See infra notes 83-105 and accompanying 
text; An Inside Look from Raleigh, North Carolina, No MORE CAGES, Oct. 1980, at 9-10 
(allegations that from any location on camp, a male officer can stand and watch women 
undress through the window); Male Guards-The Struggle is Spreading, No MORE 
CAGES, Dec. 1980, at 121 (female inmates in Oregon filed a civil suit on the basis of lack 
of privacy suffered because of the presence of male guards at the prison). 
7. See, e.g., Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1120 (4th Cir. 1981) (body cavity search in 
the presence of male guards); K. BURKHART, WOMEN IN PRISON 94 (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as BURKHART) (quoting a male warden: "[b)eing in jail is harder on a woman than a 
man. . . . She comes in here and we undress her and tell her to 'bend over lady' to look 
for contraband. We make her bathe in front of everyone .... That sort of thing can 
break your spirit."); Bedford Hills Again . .. , THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, Dec. 1979, 
at 5 (allegations that women were being stripped naked in front of male officers); An-
other Bed of Nails to Chew on, No MORE CAGES, Dec. 1980, at 44 (women from Califor-
nia Institution for Women speak out on humiliation felt when stripped naked by two 
male officers and one female officer); BURKHART, supra at 155 (in Clinton, New Jersey 
male guard tore clothes off female inmate and forced her to lie down in a spread-eagle 
position; matron did nothing). 
8. Letter from Dr. Jan Mickish, Professor of Criminology at Ball State University to 
William C. Erbecker, attorney (Sept. I, 1981) (copy on file with Laurie Hanson). 
Any sexual activity between inmate and staff must be viewed 
in the context of the social setting from which it has emerged 
and the prison setting within which it occurs. Men and women 
have long been socialized to view sex as as female commodity: 
to be sought after by males, to be exchanged for goods and 
services by females. This social characterization of males, fe-
males, and sex continues into the prison setting where male 
correctional officers have powers beyond their counterparts in 
the non prison setting .... For a staff member to request 
sexual activity is tantamount to a demand. For a staff member 
to agree to a sexual request made by an inmate is to compro-
mise his position as an agent of the state . . . . Throughout 
this whole process, it is the staff member who has the ultimate 
power over the inmate. 
9. See, e.g., BURKHART, supra note 7, at 302-03 (female prisoner working as a domes-
tic worker for warden became pregnant); Jones, One Woman Who Chose to Say No, THE 
NATION 456 (April 17, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Jones) Carol Ann Wilds, an inmate at 
Indiana Women's Prison, is'a victim of sexual harassment, exploitation and abuse by 
male personnel. She became pregnant while in prison and filed suit against the prison for 
damages. She has subsequently dropped the charges. When an investigator interviewed 
two dozen inmates of Women's Prison, all had witnessed or knew of instances of sexual 
exploitation. Thirty-eight inmates signed a petition supporting Wild's allegations. Id. at 
459. At a hearing at the California Institution for Women (CIW) in 1977, a California 
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ual favors, it may be perceived by the inmate as a demand. 
Thus, even so-called "voluntary" sexual activity must be viewed 
as coercive.10 Women prisoners are also victims of sexual abuse 
and rape.ll 
assembly committee found that: "Inmates are subject to sexual coercion and in at least 
one instance an inmate has become pregnant while serving her sentence at CIW with no 
apparent disciplinary measures taken against the staff person or persons involved." THE 
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY SELECT COMM. ON CORRECTIONS, THE CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION FOR 
WOMEN: ONE YEAR LATER, at iv (July 21, 1977). Life and Love in a Co-ed Prison, 7 
STUDENT LAWYER, Feb. 1979, at 52-53 (in Seagoville, Texas, guards had to leave because 
too emotionally involved with prisoners); Adams v. Matthias, 458 F. Supp. 302, 306 (S.D. 
Ala. 1978) (the court stated that upon occasion jail officials engaged in sexual activity 
with female inmates at the jail; one inmate became pregnant and subsequently had an 
abortion); Muncy Prison Inmate Gives Birth to Baby Boy, THE GUIDE, June 13, 1979, at 
1 Col. 1. In Muncy, Pennsylvania, a 16-year-old became pregnant while incarcerated; the 
guard charged pleaded nolo contendere. Four additional women who complained about 
sexual exploitation at Muncy have all taken lie detector tests and passed. "Sexual Har-
assment is not only the process of the staff asking for sexual activity, but also it is the 
staff member accepting, for this accepting sets into motion a whole series of sexual and 
psychological patterns that will ultimately victimize all female inmates." Letter from Dr. 
Jan Mickish, supra note 8. 
Id. 
10. See Rape as a Political Tool, No MORE CAGES, June/July 1979, 32: 
Rape of women prisoners by male guards is a common occur-
rence. Whether it is just a matter of sexual abuse of women in 
a defenseless situation, a tool to generally harass, humiliate 
and break their spirit and will, or a means of intimidation and 
punishment for those who persist in struggling and maintain-
ing their strength and integrity; rape is the one act' of violence 
specifically reserved for women. 
11. See Who's Who at Bedford Hills: Sexual Harassment by Male Guards, 
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, July/August 1982, 6. There have been allegations of nu-
merous sex abuses at Bedford Hills. One guard from Bedford Hills has recently been 
indicted for rape in the first degree, three counts of coercion, and one count of official 
misconduct. Another guard pleaded guilty to official misconduct and was sentenced to 
one year conditional discharge. Telephone interview with David Klein, Branch Chief of 
Northern Westchester District Attorney's Office, New York (March, 1983). 
Carol Ann Wilds and another prisoner at Indiana Women's Prison were raped while 
in the hospital facilities. All personnel'involved have been transferred or have resigned. 
Jones, supra note 9, at 459. See J. CHAPMAN, ECONOMIC REALITIES AND THE FEMALE OF-
FENDER, 152 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CHAPMAN] (attempted rape of JoAnne Little by 
prison guard in North Carolina). 
See also Bedford Hills: Segregation is Dangerous to Your Health, No MORE CAGES, 
June/July 1979,9 "Things were pretty bad before the male guards came back, and their 
presence there has already aggravated the situation .... [T]he mere fact that they walk 
around with long night sticks when no female guards carry these nightsticks is an irritat-
ing threat to women;" BURKHART, supra note 7, at 325-27 (prisoners of Women's House 
of Detention list allegations including being beaten by guards); Focus on Marysville, No 
MORE CAGES, Oct. 1980, 32 (Ohio women spoke out against brutality of male guards). As 
a result of speaking out, however, No MORE CAGES was banned from the Ohio institu-
tion. Stop Prison Censorship!, No MORE CAGES, July/Aug. 1981,7. 
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There are few reported cases of sexual harassment of 
women prisoners. Until recently sexual harassment, even outside 
the prison, went unnoticed. I2 Also, if a prisoner reports sexual 
abuse, the prison administration will generally blame the pris-
oner, or deny the accusation, but only occasionally fire the 
guard.13 Consequently, prisoners infrequently report abuses. 
Further, women prisoners as a class have received little atten-
tion.14 They do not bring lawsuits to protest grievances because 
they fear for their own safety. 111 It is difficult for women prison-
ers to gain access to the courts due to a lack of available services 
within the prisons. IS In recent years, however, interest in female 
prisoners' plight has been renewed. Suits have been filed on 
their behalf which have identified issues unique to them,I7 in-
12. See Jones, supra note 9, at 456 ("women don't challenge the conditions of ... 
confinement ... because prison is much like the oppression [women face] in the outside 
world."); L. FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN 12 (1978) "[S]exual harassment of working 
women has been practiced by men since women first went to work for wages. It ... has 
gone virtually unchallenged, largely as a result of a wide social acceptance of such 
behavior. " 
13. See supra notes 9 & 11. In regard to the Wilds case, discussed supra note 9, an 
Indiana Women's Prison guard, while calling Wilds' charges false, added that if he had 
to get up on the stand and say "I know there is no sexual harassment," he couldn't do 
that. Frederick & Iknovian, Sex Behind Bars?, WOMANKIND, at 9 (1981). 
14. Historically, women have only comprised 4-5% of the prison population. CHAP-
MAN, supra note 11, at 3-4. See also Albert, Women Prisoners and the Law: Which Way 
will the Pendulum Swing?, 10 J. CRIM. L. 38 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Albert]. Tradi-
tionally courts were reluctant to get involved in prison issues at all, and left the prison 
administration to govern as it saw fit. This "hands off" doctrine began changing in the 
late 1960's and to date there are some legal remedies available. See infra notes 83-92 and 
accompanying text. Most prison litigation has been on behalf of male prisoners. Prison 
reform workers have also not taken as great an interest in the female prisoner because 
conditions in the women's prisons are often not brought to public attention. Women's 
prisons are not threatened by the riots and violence that plague men's institutions and 
create sensational press coverage. See also Fabian, Toward the Best Interests of Women 
Prisoners: Is The System Working?, NEW ENG. J. PRISON L. I, 32 (1979); CHAPMAN, 
supra note 11, at 2, 5 (women perceived as passive and non-threatening to institutional 
security). 
15. Jones, supra note 9, at 456, 459. A few of the women were willing to talk on the 
record to the investigator "though prison pressure against that was formidable." Id. 
16. Albert, supra note 14, at 38; Fabian, supra note 14, at 33. Until recently, jail-
house lawyers in women's institutions were uncommon. Id. 
17. Snow, Women in Prison, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1065 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 
Snow]. Issues identified have included: (1) equal access to vocational and educational 
program, Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (discrepancy in educa-
tional and vocational programs); Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d I, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239 
(1979) (denial of minimum security jail facilities and their attendant privileges); (2) the 
right to health and adequate gynecological services, Todaro v. Ward, 431 F. Supp. 1129 
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Todaro v. Couglin, 652 F.2d 
Women's Law Forum 
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eluding rape and sexual abuse by guards18 and the right to bod-
ily privacy. 19 
Prisoners necessarily face unwanted surveillance and touch-
ing by prison personnel for the purpose of detecting contraband 
and for institutional security.20 Sexual harassment is distin-
guished from desired, mutual sexual activity by the fact that the 
recipient views the attention as unwanted. Since all observation 
in prison is basically unwanted, it is crucial that formal bounda-
ries be established as to the type of viewing or touching duties a 
male guard may perform. This Comment will examine the ten-
sion that results from placing male guards in female correctional 
facilities and suggest the boundaries which must be established 
to ensure that the prisoners' rights. are protected. While there 
are other avenues available to the inmate, both legal and admin-
54 (2d Cir. 1981) (substandard medical care for women inmates held unconstitutional as 
a violation of the eighth amendment); (3) the right to retain and breast feed infants born 
during incarceration and other issues surrounding pregnancy, see generally Note, Nine 
Months to Life-The Law and the Pregnant Inmate, 20 J. FAM. L. 523 (1981); and (4) 
the right to retain contact with her children during incarceration, see Snow, supra at 
1065; Note, Nine Months to Life-The Law and the Pregnant Inmate, supra at 536. 
The Statement of purpose, No MORE CAGES, (June/July 1979) declares: 
We have chosen to focus on women in prison because . . . 
there are problems special to women in prison, as distin-
guished from the oppression faced by all those in prison: The 
presence and physical threat of male guards, the overall sex-
ism of the prison system, the lack of specialized training which 
leads to fewer available jobs, the tragedy of mothers separated 
from their children, the assault on women's reproductive or-
gans, and much more. 
On November 7, 1980, there was a national conference on women in prison. Workehop 
and speaker issues included the physical and psychological aspects of imprisonment (sex-
ual and medical abuse) and examples of sexual abuse in prison including unnecessary 
and humiliating vaginal searches. See also Conference on Women in Prison: Report from 
Atlanta, GA., No MORE CAGES, Dec. 1980, 41-42). 
According to Chapman, this new interest in the female offender and prisoner is due 
in part to the perception that criminal activity has increased among women, but, she 
feels the major impetus seems to be the women's movement. Women are (re)discovering 
the role sexism plays in the criminal process as they identify the disparate treatment 
men and women receive throughout the judicial process and incarceration. CHAPMAN, 
supra note 11, at 6, 21-38. 
18. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 68-92 and accompanying text; Snow, supra note 17, at 1065 
(mentions the right not to be guarded by males which flows directly from rape and pri-
vacy issues). 
20. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 553-560 (1978) (although inmates retain privacy 
rights upon incarceration, they must be balanced against significant and legitimate se-
curity interests of the institution). See also infra notes 122-128 and accompanying text. 
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istrative,21 the establishment of a constitutional right to bodily 
privacy lays the groundwork for protection against any form of 
sexual harassment from which other remedies may evolve. 
Women inmates have a constitutional right to privacy, dignity, 
and autonomy in regard to their own bodies, and this includes 
the right to be free from sexual abuse and harassment by male 
guards. There is no reasonable justification for any infringement 
upon this right. 
I. BACKGROUND: SEXUAL ABUSE IN AMERICAN PRISONS 
Sexual harassment of women in prison as well as the subse-
quent disregard for the victims of the harassment is not a new 
phenomenon. The earliest documented incident between a male 
guard and a female prisoner occured 'in 1826.22 When a grand 
jury investigated the death of an Auburn prisoner and discov-
ered that she had died during childbirth after she had received a 
severe flogging, they ignored the fact that she had become preg-
nant while in solitary confinement. 28 The scandal created when 
knowledge of this incident reached the public may have spurred 
the passage of the 1828 law which required segregation of male 
and female prisoners.24 Even when prisoners were successfully 
segregated by sex, however, women prisoners were supervised by 
male guards who often took sexual liberties with them;21i due to 
over-crowding and basic disinterest in women prisoners and 
their rehabilitation, even the presence of matrons did not lessen 
the abuse.28 The pregnancy at Auburn was not an isolated inci-
21. For a discussion of tort remedies for sexual harassment see Note, Sexual Har-
assment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE 
U.L. REV. 879 (1980); For a discussion of sexual harassment as sex discrimination see 
MACKINNON, supra note 3; For a discussion of Title VII remedies see Comment, Title 
VII: Legal Protection Against Sexual Harassment, 53 WASH. L. REV. 123 (1977). Admin-
istrative remedies are also available. See intra notes 150-152 and accompanying text. See 
also Fabian, supra note 14, at 53. It would be to the prisoners' benefit to have members 
of community groups, such as local rape crisis centers, serve on committees which both 
oversee the administration of the prison and have direct contact with the prisoners. 
22. E. FREEDMAN, THEIR SISTER'S KEEPERS 15 (1981) [hereinafter cited as FREED-
MAN]; N. Shafer, By Women For Women: America's First Separate Prison for Women 17 




25. Albert, supra note 14, at 37. 
26. Shafer, supra note 22, at 9-10. This is stiJI true today; see supra note 14. BURK-
HART, supra note 7, at 155, 326, 332; FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 16; But ct. CHAPMAN, 
Women's Law Forum 
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dent, as most accounts of prisons during the 1800's mention ille-
gitimate births.27 
Society regarded women prisoners as "fallen" women and 
beyond redemption.28 Socially, women were seen as having a 
"superior morality" to that of men.29 Therefore, if a woman 
committed a crime, she had denied her own pure nature and was 
"more depraved than her male counterpart."30 In the 1860's the 
plight of the "fallen" woman was reconsidered and the notion 
that she could be reformed (by women) was embraced by novel-
ists and Christian reform workers.31 The commitment to create a 
pleasant, supportive, productive community of women came in 
part from the reformers' belief that most women were not inten-
tional criminals but were lured into such activity by their hus-
bands or boyfriends, or out of economic necessity.32 
Women prisoners were considered useless and were ne-
glected by prison authorities because their numbers were few 
and their labor could not be sold. The neglect, however, was not 
benign "[R]ather a pattern of overcrowding, harsh treatment 
and sexual abuse recurred throughout prison histories. "33 Prison 
authorities opposed the segregation movement, even though 
they considered the women prisoners useless, because they did 
not want to lose their domestic help.34 
In 1868 the governor of Indiana solicited two Quaker prison 
reformers to investigate conditions at the state prison and sub-
mit a report to him.311 Although the Quakers observed many 
abuses occurring within the prison, they were most distressed by 
the sexual abuses the women suffered: 
supra note 11, at 3-4 (high incidence of sexual abuse in southern jails attributed to the 
almost total absence of matrons.) 
27. See FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 16, 59, 60; Shafer, supra note 22, at 6-11, 17. 
28. Shafer, supra note 22, at 17. 
29. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 17. 
30. Shafer, supra note 22, at 14-21 (general discussion of the "fallen" woman and 
her threat to Victorian society.) 
31. Id. at 40. 
32. Note, Pioneers in Prison, 44 FED. PROBATION 30, 31 (Sept. 1980); See also BURK-
HART, supra note 4, at 366-68; CHAPMAN, supra note 11, at 15-17. For a general discussion 
of the professional reformers see FREEDMAN, supra note 22 .. 
33. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 15. 
34. Albert, supra note 14, at 37. 
35. Shafer, supra note 22, at 5. 
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A number of the guards had keys to the women's 
prison and entered when they wished to gratify 
their lusts. If the women could be bought up, they 
gave them trinkets or goods out of the govern-
ment store, if they did not yield, they were re-
ported as incorrigible and stripped and whipped 
in the presence of as many as wished to see. In 
the court of the prison there was a large reser-
voir .... On sabbath afternoons, the women pris-
oners were brought out and compelled to strip 
and . . . required to run from the opposite side 
and jump into the water, the guards using, if nec-
essary, their lashes to drive them out to the howl-
ing amusement of the guards and their friends 
who were permitted to be present, keeping it up 
as long as they pleased.38 
When the scandals the Quakers uncovered came to light in the 
late 1860's, the progressive movement to reform women prison-
ers and to create humane facilities for each sex gained consider-
able support.37 The reformers believed that separate facilities 
were necessary to protect the women from physical abuse38 as 
well as sexism. Many reformers believed that, just as in society 
at large, men contributed to, rather than cured, women's delin-
quency.39 Therefore, to reform the female offender and to keep 
her free from sexual abuse, a separate facility (reformatory) was 
necessary. Reform could only be achieved if women were gov-
erned by a staff who could supply them with the necessary 
morals and feminine treatment.40 "[S]ince industry, morality 
and religion were regarded as the province of women, only 
women were capable of staffing the reformatory."41 
The first women's prison opened in Indiana in 1873.42 By 
3S. [d. See also FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 59-SO (prostitution rings and other 
abuses operating within prisons). It is interesting that in almost every other account of 
the reform and segregation movement, the incidence of sexual abuse is not mentioned. 
Sexual abuse and rape of women has traditionally been hidden, and prison is no 
exception. 
37. Shafer, supra note 22, at 12. 
38. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 52,59,SO; see also BURKHART, supra note 4, at 83; 
Shafer, supra note 22, at S-10. 
39. [d. 
40. Shafer, supra note 22, at 7-14. 
41. [d. at 14. 
42. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 144-45. 
Women's Law Forum 
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1940 a total of twenty-three states had established separate 
women's prisons, and by 1975 only sixteen states lacked them.43 
However, the idealism and energy of the reformers did not sur-
vive the changes in prison administration over the years.44 As 
early as the 1920's the separate prison, although run by women, 
no longer existed to serve women. Rather, the prisons were ad-
ministered by women who did not share the feminist philosophy 
that women prisoners could be reformed. These administrators 
were not critical of men's prisons or male dominated institu-
tions.411 Today, female prisoners find themselves in "punitive-se-
curity-based environments the women's prison reform move-
ment was organized to oppose" because prison authorities 
question whether institutional rehabilitation (reform) is success-
ful. 46 Indeed, what began as a measure to help and protect 
women, deteriorated over the years into more neglect and re-
strictive and unequal separation.47 
The segregation of prisons did not end sexual harassment of 
women prisoners. Some states did not create separate facilities 
at a11,46 and others allowed men to guard women with no restric-
tions.49 The problem of sexual harassment of women prisoners is 
still rampant. IIO 
43. [d. 
Whatever the shortcomings of the institutions the 
reformers created, they had clear insight into the 
dangers of male-dominated institutions. Many of 
the hostile attitudes toward female criminals they 
identified a hundred years ago persist today 
throughout society. The stigma of woman's fall 
may be less critical, but the fact that most women 
prisoners are now not only poor but also non-
white compounds their powerlessness. The old re-
formist concern for women's victimization has 
new foundations that necessitate continued scru-
tiny of the criminal justice system. III 
44. CHAPMAN, supra note 1, at 16. 
45. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 155. 
46. Fabian, supra note 14, at 6. 
47. Snow, supra note 17, at 1065. 
48. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
49. See Appendix A, infra for present day statistics regarding the number of male 
guards in women's prisons and the restrictions placed on them. 
50. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text. 
51. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 157. 
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II. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY: PROTECTING BODILY INTEGRITY 
The basis for a prisoner's right to freedom from sexual har-
assment, or the right to bodily integrity may be found within the 
fourth amendment guarantee of freedom from unreasonable 
searches or the more general right of privacy which has been rec-
ognized within that amendment. 
Prior to 1967, fourth amendment violations occurred if 
there was a finding of physical trespass.1I11 That privacy and dig-
nity could be invaded without a physical trespass of any sort was 
not part of any judicial privacy theory. liS Justice Brandeis, how-
ever, laid the groundwork for such a concept in his dissent in 
Olmstead v. United States. 1I4 "[T]o protect [the right to be let 
alone] every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the 
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must 
be deemed a violation of the fourth amendment."1111 Brandeis' 
concept of privacy was adopted fifty years later in Katz v. 
United States when the United States Supreme Court held that 
fourth amendment protection cannot stop with physical tres-
pass.1I6 Katz laid the foundation for the "reasonable expectation 
of privacy" theory upon which many fourth amendment deci-
sions now rest, including decisions protecting reasonable expec-
tations of physical or bodily privacy.1I7 Involuntary exposure of 
one's naked body has been held to be a violation of that right.1I8 
Thus, the unwanted observation of female inmates by male 
guards may be a violation of a reasonable expectation of bodily 
privacy. 
52. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), was the first decision in which the 
Court enunciated that a fourth amendment violation could occur without physical tres-
pass. The Court held that evidence heard over a wiretap during the course of a criminal 
investigation was illegally obtained because defendant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy while placing a call in a phone booth. The Court stated that the fourth amend-
ment protects people, not places. 1d. at 353. 
53. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (evidence heard over a 
wiretap was legally obtained because there was no physical trespass). 
54. 227 U.S. 438 (1928). 
55. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
56. 389 U.S. at 353. 
57. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 9 (1968) (stop and frisk procedures are 
within the purview of the fourth amendment). 
58. York v. Storey, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, Storey v. York, 
376 U.S. 939 (1964) (police officers who unnecessarily photographed female assault vic-
tim and subsequently passed the photographs around were held to have violated the 
woman's right to privacy). 
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The right to bodily privacy may also be found within the 
concept of privacy developed from the Supreme Court's 1965 de-
cision in Griswold v. Connecticut.r.s The articulation of this con-
cept of privacy,60 philosophical in both its analysis and effect, 
was the beginning of a new era of substantive due process and, 
hence, an expansion of individual human rights. In G.riswold, the 
concept of privacy has its roots in specific constitutional provi-
sions, but it is not restricted in scope or content solely by the 
express language of the enumerated rights.61 Griswold and its 
progeny62 protect an interest similar to that found in the fourth 
amendment-the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters, specifically matters relating to procreation. This inter-
est is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion.63 
59. 381 u.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court struck down as unconstitutional a 
Connecticut statute prohibiting distribution of, and married persons' use of, contracep-
tives. The Court held that in light of, and emanating from, decisions which embrace 
rights peripheral to the first amendment, and various guarantees implicit in the third, 
fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments, a zone of privacy is created. Thus, even though 
marriage is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, it may be included in this 
zone of privacy and thereby deemed fundamental. 
60. The right to privacy is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution and its 
origin is unclear. Privacy is a judicially developed concept, whose birth and growth re-
flect the Court's determination to advance principles it feels society is willing or ready to 
accept. The "right" was first discussed in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 
250, 251 (1891), where the Court stated: "no right is held more sacred, or is more care-
fully guarded by the common law, ,than the right of every individual to the possession 
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by 
clear and unquestionable authority of law." Id. As individuals bring suit to contest gov-
ernmental control over certain aspects of their lives, decisions are rendered which clarify 
the "rights" the Supreme Court deems fundamental. Thus, the Constitution can be seen 
as a "statement of political principles, to be interpreted and applied by the Court in 
light of changing circumstances." Beany, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right 
To Privacy, WIS. L. REV. 979, 986 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Beany). The author quotes 
Chief Justice Marshall: "We must never forget that it is a Constitution we are ex-
pounding," a Constitution "intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be 
adapted to the various crises in human affairs." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat) 316, 407 (1819). 
61. According to the Court, this right derives from natural law; from the ninth 
amendment; from the word "liberty" in the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments, as shadows or penumbras of the bill of Rights, thus creating "zones 
of privacy"; or as a combination of all these expressions. See generally, Beany, supra 
note 60. 
62. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extended the right to be free from 
governmental intrusion when buying contraceptives to individuals, regardless of marital 
status, on the theory that prohibiting the sale of, or information regarding, contracep-
tives to unmarried persons, while permitting it to married persons, violated the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as well as the unmarried persons' right to 
privacy). 
63. In Griswold, part of the rationale for finding the statute unconstitutional was 
11
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In Roe v. Wade,84 the Supreme Court enunciated a new in-
terest emanating from a different source.811 This interest, 
founded in the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal lib-
erty and restrictions upon state action, was broad enough to en-
compass a woman's right to privacy in deciding whether or not 
to terminate her pregnancy.88 Thus, there exists a fundamental 
right for a woman to make certain choices regarding her body 
and reproduction. 
This general concept of privacy found within the fourth 
amendment, Griswold, Roe, and their progeny encompasses de-
veloping interests which flow from the basic guidelines expressed 
by the Court.87 The autonomy and dignity of a woman prisoner 
to remain free from sexual harassment should certainly be pro-
tected by this general concept of privacy. 
III. BODILY INTEGRITY INSIDE THE PRISON WALLS 
A prison is, almost by definition, a place where the resident 
has lost her privacy.88 Therefore, it is not surprising that a con-
cept of a right to bodily privacy and autonomy for women pris-
oners has not yet been formulated by the Supreme Court.89 
the knowledge that to find otherwise would mandate that the government patrol marital 
bedrooms looking for evidence, clearly an invasion of privacy. 479 U.S. at 485-86. See 
also Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating restric-
tions on distribution of nonprescription contraceptives as being at the heart of constitu-
tionally protected choices; access to contraceptives is necessary to protect the fundamen-
tal right guaranteed in Griswold). 
64. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
65. [d. at 153. The Court stressed that the right may emanate from the ninth 
amendment; that the liberty which is protected from infringement by the federal govern-
ment or the states by the fifth and fourteenth amendments is not restricted only to those 
rights specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments. 
66. [d. 
67. If a concept of privacy is to be complete, it must embrace both momentous (Roe, 
410 U.S. 113, (right to have an abortion); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.1976), (right 
to choose between life and death) and every day ends of the spectrum (Kelly v. Johnson, 
425 U.S. 238 (1976) (county regulation limiting the length of county policemen's hair 
does not violate the fourteenth amendment); for if it does not, it "leaves the state free to 
interfere with those aspects of individual lives which have no direct bearing on the abil-
ity of others to enjoy their liberty." Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (1st 
Cir. 1970) ("within the commodious concept of liberty embracing freedoms great and 
small, is the right to wear one's hair as he wishes."). 
68. See generally Singer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Dignity in the Prison, 21 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 669 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Singer) (discussion of the constitutional 
aspects of the degradation process in prisons). 
69. This concept is, however, working its way up the federal circuits. See infra notes 
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There was a time when prisoners had no rights at all: 
The bill of rights is a declaration of general prin-
ciples to govern a society of freemen and not of 
convicted felons and men civilly dead. Such men 
have some rights it is true, such as the law in its 
benignity accords to them, but not the rights of 
freemen. They are slaves of the state . . . they 
must be subject to the regulations of the institu-
tion .... 70 
679 
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has established that 
convicted prisoners "do not forfeit all constitutional protections 
by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison."71 Con-
stitutional guarantees which have been held to survive the 
prison wall include: freedom from unreasonable searches and 
seizures under the fourth amendment,72 religious freedom under 
the first and fourteenth amendments,78 protection against racial 
discrimination under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment,74 equal access to the courts,711 freedom from 
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment,76 
and due process of law.77 Whether the right to privacy can be 
extended to women prisoners as a basis for protection against 
sexual harassment is the subject of the remainder of this 
Comment. 
93-105 and accompanying text. 
70. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790,796 (1871) (principles declared 
in the bill of rights are not applicable to convicted felons). 
71. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1978) (class action suit challenging the consti-
tutionality of conditions in federal institution). 
72. See infra notes 94-109 and accompanying text. 
73. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam) (Texas violated the first and 
fourteenth amendments by not allowing a Buddhist a reasonable opportunity to pursue 
his faith). 
74. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam) (Alabama statutes requir-
ing segregation of the ra~es in prisons and jails violate the fourteenth amendment). 
75. Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 109 (1970), aff'd per curiam sub nom, 
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (reasonable access to the courts is a constitu-
tional imperative which prevails against a variety of state interests). 
76. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) (cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause covers conditions of confinement which may make intolerable an otherwise 
constitutional term of imprisonment). 
77. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972) (per curiam) (since the court cannot 
prove beyond a doubt that allegations of prisoner's pro se complaint cannot be sup-
ported. he is entitled to an opportunity to offer prooO. 
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A. Bodily Integrity: Freedom from Unwanted Viewing by 
Male Guards 
In western culture certain values are second nature and 
mandatory, such as clothing one's body or, more specifically, 
one's genitals. Women and men appear to have an innate need 
for privacy in certain areas of living as evidenced by the fact 
that toilet facilities are enclosed in the home and segregated in 
public.78 The desire to protect one's nudity from unwanted ex-
posure, particularly to members of the opposite sex, involves 
both a physical instinct and an emotional and social craving for 
privacy. In expanding the right to privacy to include the unwar-
ranted observation of one's naked body, the Ninth Circuit 
stated: "We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of privacy 
than the naked body. The desire to shield one's unclothed figure 
[sic] from view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the op-
posite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal 
dignity. "79 This desire for dignity transcends the prison walls. 
Indeed, state and federal courts have held that if guards are in a 
position to watch inmates of the opposite sex who are engaged in 
personal private activities, such as undressing, using toilet facili-
ties, showering, or talking to medical personnel, the inmates' 
constitutional rights of privacy have been violated.80 
Until now, however, female prisoners have instituted only 
one suit81 challenging these prison practices.8l1 In Forts v. Ward, 
78. Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated in part, 621 
F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980) (administrative remedy granted to balance right of a female 
prison inmate to privacy with the right of equal job opportunity regardle88 of sex). 
79. York v. Storey, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, Storey v. York, 
376 U.S. 939 (1964). 
80. See Gumbey v. Meachum, 684 F.2d 712, 714 (1982) (male plaintiffs' statements 
that they were subject to a "certain amount of viewing" by female guards does not neces-
sarily fall short of a cognizable claim); Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252, 1316-17 
(S.D. W. Va. 1981) (privacy of female prisoners severely infringed because male deputies 
could peer into their cells); Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (fe-
male guards viewing male inmates; inmate has a limited right to privacy which includes 
the right to be free from unrestricted observation of their genitals by members of the 
opposite sex); Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890 (D. Md. 1980) (female guards 
viewing male inmates; inmate has a limited right to privacy which includes the right to 
be free from unrestricted observation of their genitals by members of the opposite sex); 
Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated in part, 621 F.2d 1210 
(2d Cir. 1980). 
81. Forts v. Ward, 434 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 566 F.2d 
849 (2d Cir. 1977), on remand, 471 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated in part, 621 
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the inmates charged that they were severely humiliated and de-
prived of their dignity because male guards were regularly per-
mitted to view them naked.ss At the trial level, the court en-
joined the assignment of male guards to night duty,S" from the 
infirmary, and from making first rounds in the morning. The 
court further ordered that the showers be modified so that 
guards could not observe the women while showering.811 
It is neither penologically required nor per-
missible (1) that during the day an inmate be in a 
situation where (a) she may be or must risk being 
viewed completely or partly in the nude by a male 
guard in the course of his duties or (b) she may be 
observed while using the toilet; (2) that during 
the night she be observed rising from sleep to use 
the toilet, or suffer herself to be observed perhaps 
numerous times during her sleep in whatever may 
be her disarray of bed clothes or nightgown-or 
no garments at all on a hot and airless night; (3) 
that her head be directly observed by a male 
guard while she is taking a shower; and (4) that a 
male guard in the prison hospital be so stationed 
F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980). 
82. The ruling in Dawson on behalf of the women prisoners was part of an opinion 
which found that a county facility operated in violation of many rights of both female 
and male prisoners. 527 F. Supp. at 1317. 
83. In 1977, women inmates at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility sued for injunc-
tive relief and damages, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), for redress of deprivation of 
their right of privacy under the first, ninth and fourteenth amendments caused by the 
posting of male guards in various places in the prison including the housing units. Forts, 
434 F. Supp. 946. The complaint also alleged that the practices complained of consti-
tuted an unwarranted intrusion into the privacy and person of the plaintiffs under the 
fourth amendment and that the mere placement of men in women's prisons is designed 
to strip women prisoners of their dignity and moral integrity and was a violation of the 
eighth amendment. Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint, at 9, cited in Forts v. Ward, 434 
F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
The male corrections officers at Bedford Hills perform all duties previously per-
formed by women corrections officers. The male officers were assigned to the housing and 
hospital units in February, 1977, in response to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
This complaint was filed two months later, in April 1977. 471 F. Supp. at 1097-98. 
84. This ruling was modified in Forts, 621 F.2d at 1217, where the appellate court 
vacated the order which prohibited the assignment of male guards to the nighttime 
shifts. "We seriously doubt that the inmates' interests in style or even in avoiding the 
occasional discomfort of warmth from a sleeping garment are of sufficient gravity to jus-
tify denial of equal employment opportunities [for the male guards)." ld. While such a 
ruling at least provides a choice for the prisoner, the court makes it clear that the right 
to dignity and autonomy for women is not as important as equal job opportunity for 
men. 
85. Forts, 471 F. Supp. at 1099-1101. 
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as to permit him under normal circumstances to 
view an inmate wholly or partially unclothed.88 
Crucial to its opinion was the court's conclusion that a woman's 
right to bodily privacy is invaded if her head is obseryed when 
she showers even though her entire body is not visible to the 
male guard. Because the prisoner can see the guard and knows 
she has no clothes on, her own sense of dignity and bodily integ-
rity is invaded.87 The court based its holding on the fact that 
virtually all societies have rules for concealing female genitals,ss 
and recognized a woman's particular need for bodily privacy.s9 
Involuntary exposure takes on a greater significance for 
women than for men in our society, where a woman's body is 
viewed as a sexual object and commodity90 and where pornogra-
phy and violence against women is acceptable.91 For women, un-
wanted exposure is harassment in and of itself. Sometimes the 
observation may be inadvertent, other times deliberate; but no 
matter what the justification, the female will most always feel 
embarrassment, humiliation, and shame. She will feel all that is 
associated with the knowledge that her body is being viewed as a 
sexual object.92 Therefore, to subject a female prisoner to the 
unwanted gaze of male guards while she is nude deprives her of 
86. Id. at 1099-1100. 
87. Id. at 1100, n.20. 
88. Id. at 1098. "The fact that a need for privacy is the product of social condition-
ing makes it no less embarrassing or occasions no less feeling of shame when the privacy 
is invaded." Id. 
89.Id. 
90. See, e.g., S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 6-22 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as BROWN MILLER] (study of women's status as chattel through-
out history); MACKINNON, supra, note 3 at 174-75 (historically, women have been re-
Quired to exchange sexual services for material survival in one form or another); Note, 
Sexual Display of Women's Bodies-A Violation of Privacy, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
1211 (1980). 
91. A. MEDEA & K. THOMPSON, AGAINST RAPE 3-7 (1974) (pervasiveness of violence 
against women in this country); A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY, MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 
101-28 (1981) (pornography and the objectification of women). 
92. The gut distaste that a majority of women feel when we look 
at pornography ... comes, I think from the gut knowledge 
that we and our bodies are being stripped, exposed and con-
torted for the purpose of ridicule to bolster that 'masculine 
esteem' which gets its kick and sense of power from viewing 
females as anonymous, panting playthings, adult toys, dehu-
manized objects to be used, abused, broken and dis-
carded. . . . This, of course, is also the philosophy of rape. 
BROWNMILLER, supra note 90, at 442. 
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her integrity and is a violation of constitutionally guaranteed 
privacy. 
B. The Physical Aspect: Freedom from Touching 
Laws which prescribe punishment for rape, sexual abuse, as-
sault, and battery provide the protections society has deemed 
necessary in order to keep each individual free from unwanted 
touching and violence. These protections extend to prisoners.93 
There are some situations however, where unwanted touching in 
the form of searches is necessary to investigate crimes94 or to 
keep prisons free of contraband.9~ The fourth amendment pro-
tects individuals from illegal invasions of their "persons, houses, 
papers, and effects" by the government.98 Courts have treated 
body searches as serious intrusions, even those as slight as a 
"frisk", because they inflict great indignity and arouse strong 
resentment.97 
Courts have indicated that a body cavity or genital search 
by a member of the opposite sex is a violation of the inmate's 
right to privacy.98 A prison's interest in excluding all contraband 
justifies its surveillance of the prisoners and their cells, and jus-
tifies body searches as well,99 But that security interest, as well 
as the reasonableness of the search, is balanced against the inva-
93. Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973). Prisoners have a consti-
tutional right to be reasonably protected from the constant threat of violence and sexual 
assault. In a § 1983 action, prisoners must demonstrate a "pervasive risk of harm to in-
mates from other prisoners" and that prison officials "failed to exercise reasonable care" 
to prevent the unreasonable risk of harm or harm itself." [d. 
94. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
95. Daugherty v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 
(1973). 
96. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433, 454 n.4 (1971) (warrantless search 
and seizure of automobile unconstitutional under the fourth amendment). 
97. 392 U.S. at 9. 
98. Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981). Pat searches excluding genital areas 
by female guards upon male inmates did not violate their constitutional right to privacy. 
The court stated, however, that a search of the genitals by a member of the opposite sex 
was a needless indignity that is an imposition insofar as it goes beyond recognized neces-
sity. [d. at 137. Smith v. Fairman, 687 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1982) (instructing female 
guards to exclude the genital area on male inmates when conducting a frisk affords the 
inmate the privacy he is entitled to in this context). 
99. United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831, 832 (8th Cir. 1977) (lack of warrant re-




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983
684 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:667 
sion of the prisoner's dignity.loo "To require one to not only sub-
mit to such a search, but to have it performed by a member of 
the opposite sex could well, for many people, only add to the 
feeling of degradation. "101 
In a Fourth Circuit case, it was found to be an unreasonable 
invasion of the female inmate's privacy to be stripped by a fe-
male guard in the presence of male guards. l02 The court rea-
soned that generally people have a special sense of privacy about 
their genitals, and involuntary exposure to someone of the oppo-
site sex may be especially demeaning and humiliating. lOS Cer-
tainly, if it is an unreasonable invasion of privacy to be stripped 
and searched in the presence of male guards, it is unreasonable 
to be searched by male guards. Indeed, that "special sense of 
privacy" has been the basis for decisions which have dealt with 
body searches by members of the opposite sex.104 In cases which 
have involved female guards and male prisoners, courts have 
held that pat searches were allowed so long as the genital areas 
were excluded. loa A body search of a female prisoner by a male 
guard which includes the genitals or breasts is a violation of the 
fourth amendment because it unreasonably invades her expecta-
100. United States v. Lilly, 576 F.2d 1240, 1247 (5th Cir. 1978) (body cavity search 
found unreasonable because the woman was not given notice that her voluntary absences 
from prison could subject her to random searches). See, e.g., Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 
F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1975) (court concluded that the right of privacy includes a 
prohibition of humiliating and unnecessary searches, but allows a prison regulation au-
thorizing random shakedowns). "We hold that a prisoner enjoys the protection of the 
[f)ourth [almendment against unreasonable searches, at least to some minimal extent." 
Id. 
It is settled law that the determination of reasonableness in any fourth amendment 
case depends on the particular facts of the case. To determine whether a particular 
search or seizure was reasonable, the court must balance the public interest in con-
ducting the search against the individual's fourth amendment interest. See United 
States v. Martinez Fuerle, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976) (border patrol's permanent check-
point station does not violate the fourth amendment). See also Hodges v. Klein, 412 F. 
Supp. 896, 903 (D. N.J. 1976) (guards cannot conduct a visual and anal search of an in-
mate unless there is a reasonably clear indication that the inmate is concealing some-
thing in a body cavity); Frazier v. Ward, 426 F. Supp. 1354, 1366 (D. N.J. 1976) (routine 
rectal and testicle searches conducted in a debasing manner and not for any genuine 
security purpose constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and 
fourteenth amendments). 
101. United States ex reI. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
102. Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1120 (4th Cir. 1981). 
103. Id. at 1119. 
104. Smith v. Fairman, 687 F.2d 122; Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 132 (Or. 1981). 
105. Smith v. Fairman, 687 F.2d 122; Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 132 (Or. 1981). 
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tion of privacy. 
This limited protection (i.e. excluding genitals and breasts), 
however, is not enough. Because of the imbalance of power in 
prison,106 the possibilities of rape and other forms of sexual 
abuse dramatically increase if male guards are allowed to touch 
the prisoners in any way.l07 Any touching, except that in a bona 
fide emergency, 108 should therefore be viewed as a violation of 
the fourth amendment and should not be permitted. 109 
C. Freedom from Sexual Exploitation 
The right to privacy, as set forth in Roe and its progeny, 
encompasses the freedom to make certain important deci-
sions. no Although the right to privacy has been narrowly inter-
preted, the Supreme Court has recognized at least the need for 
autonomy in making decisions related to reproduction.lll Since a 
risk in any sexual relationship between a female inmate and a 
male guard is the possibility of pregnancy, the choice of whether 
or not to participate in that relationship should be protected by 
Roe. Any choice involving autonomy and dignity in decision 
making related to procreation must necessarily be recognized in 
the fourteenth amendment notion of liberty. 
Sexual relationships between inmates and guards are the 
product of sexual exploitation and cannot be defined as volun-
tary.ll2 While most prisons have a policy that guards may not 
"fraternize" with inmates,113 that policy does not afford the pris-
oner adequate protection.H • Often a prisoner will maintain a 
106. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text. 
107. See supra notes 2-19 and accompanying text. But cf. United States ex rei. 
Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), 
rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
108. Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854, 866 (5th Cir. 1982) (only in a bona fide emergency 
may the officer in charge depart from standards governing the use of force). 
109. Violation of the fourth amendment in this sense is a violation of the compound 
of privacy found within that amendment. See generally Singer, supra note 68, at 671-84. 
110. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying 
text. 
111. [d. 
112. Telephone interview with Dr. Jan Mickish, Professor of Criminology, Ball State 
University (Sept. 16, 1982). 
113. See, e.g., United States ex rei. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977). 
114. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text. 
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sexual relationship with a guard because she has been 
threatened with some form of further punishment if she· does 
not cooperateY& Generally, women prisoners do not voice com-
plaints due to fear for their own safety and because they doubt 
that any action will be taken to prevent the carrying out of the 
threats or the sex abuse. lIB 
The pattern of sexual exploitation which pervades prisons 
may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth 
and fourteenth amendments. ll7 If the patterns of exploitation 
rise to the level of an eighth amendment violation, the prisoner's 
right to be free from sexual exploitation has been violated. 118 
This right may be included within the penumbra of the eighth 
amendment and should therefore be included within the pro-
tected zone of privacy articulated in Griswold. 119 Thus, under 
Roe and Griswold the prisoner would have a right to privacy 
which includes freedom from forced sexual relationships. 
Since the right to privacy is fundamental, it may be in-
fringed upon only if the government shows a compelling state 
interest.120 Because the power imbalance in the prisoner-guard 
relationship is so great, government itself must eliminate sexual 
harassment in prison or assume responsibility for prisoner ex-
115. Telephone interview with David Klein, Branch Chief of Northern Westchester 
District Attorney's Office, New York (March 23, 1983). Recently two guards at Bedford 
Hill's were charged with official misconduct and one with rape as a result of coercive 
sexual encounters even though there was no physical force involved. Id. 
116. [d. 
117. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973) For conduct to be characterized 
as "cruel and unusual" under the eighth amendment, it must not be spontaneous, but 
rather, due to conditions which make imprisonment intolerable. [d. at 1032. 
118. The basic concept which underlies the eighth amendment is nothing less than 
the dignity of men (women). Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). To prove that sex-
ual exploitation rises to the level of an eighth amendment violation, there are three prin-
cipal tests which must be applied: 
1. The punishment in question must not shock the collective conscience of our 
society; 
2. The punishment must not be unnecessarily cruel; and 
3. The punishment not go beyond the legitimate goals of the state. 
Albert, supra note 14, at 40. The failure to provide an inmate with an environment that 
does not impair his physical and mental health violates due process. Failure to provide 
adequate living space and to provide security violates the eighth amendment. Adams v. 
Matthias, 458 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Ala. 1978). 
119. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
120. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
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ploitation. The government's inaction in this case is as harmful 
as pointedly condoning the activity.121 Therefore, the relevant 
question is whether the government has a compelling interest 
not to interfere in the sexual exploitation in prisons. Unless the 
government has an interest in maintaining the power structure 
and the sexual exploitation of female prisoners, a woman pris-
oner's right to be free from sexual harassment in prison, implicit 
within the right of privacy, has been violated. 
IV. INADEQUATE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INFRINGEMENT UPON HUMAN 
DIGNITY 
The right to dignity and autonomy in prison has not yet 
been recognized as fully as is necessary to protect women prison-
ers adequately.122 Generally, inmates retain rights that are not 
inconsistent with prisoner status or with government interests in 
rehabilitation and institutional security.123 Because women pris-
oners are generally less violent than male prisoners,124 institu-
tional security, absent a bona /ide emergency,l2G should not be 
the chief factor in establishing the parameters of female prison-
ers' rights. For security reasons it may be necessary to conduct 
body searches to keep the prison free from contraband.126 How-
ever, even though the purpose of the search is legitimate, if it 
"broadly stifle[s] fundamental personal liberties"l27 it may not 
be pursued if the desired end can be reached by narrower 
means.128 Since a body search by a male is an invasion of the 
woman's right to privacy, another less intrusive procedure must 
be followed. 
In United States v. Lilly129 the Fifth Circuit held that since 
the prisoner did not have notice that there would be random 
121. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference by prison person-
nel to a prisoner's serious illness or injury constitutes cruel and unusual punishment). 
122. See infra notes 123·159. 
123. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (correctional inmates 
retain first amendment communicative rights which are not inconsistent with prisoner 
status or with governmental interests in institutional security and rehabilitation). See 
also supra notes 12·19 and accompanying text. 
124. CHAPMAN, supra note 11, at 5. 
125. 666 F.2d at 866. 
126. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
127. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
128. [d. 
129. 576 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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body searches, performing them was unreasonable and in con-
travention of her fourth amendment rights.130 Because notice is 
required, there should never. be a situation in which a female 
guard is not on duty to perform the necessary search. It is an 
infringement of a woman's dignity and fundamental right to pri-
vacy to be searched by,131 or in the presence of,182 male guards, 
when there is a narrower means to achieve the governmental ob-
jective. There is therefore no institutional security interest ab-
sent an extreme, bona fide emergency, strong enough to infringe 
upon the prisoner's right to dignity. Thus, a male guard should 
never have occasion to touch a female inmate. 
Certainly, the government has no rehabilitation interest in 
subjecting prisoners to unnecessary observation or touching by 
guards of the opposite sex.188 The government's reason for in-
fringing upon the prisoner's right to privacy has been based on 
the justification that guards must be offered equal job opportu-
nity as mandated by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.184 
Ironically, inmate privacy rights have evolved from the same act 
which protects job opportunities for opposite-sexed guards In 
the prisons.1811 
In addition, the right to privacy for prisoners, upon which 
the right to be free from sexual harassment is based, has evolved 
as a defense against claims by female guards who seek equal ac-
cess to employment in male institutions.188 Institutional secur-
130. Id. at 1246-47. 
131. See supra notes 93-109 and accompanying text. 
132. Id. See also Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1120 (4th Cir. 1981). One of the 
defenses the prison can raise when charged with conducting a search in contravention of 
the fourth amendment is that the prisoner gave consent to the search. At least one court 
in dissent has recognized that consent cannot be the product of a threat that the search 
will be done in the presence of males if a woman prisoner does not consent to the search. 
Patently any consent under these circumstances is the product of coercion. Such a ma-
nipulation of a prisoner's right is not necessary for institutional security. United States 
v. Lilly, 576 F.2d at 1248 (Thornberry, J., dissenting). 
133. 514 F. Supp. at 203-04. 
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(i) (1976) provides in relevant part: "(a) [ilt shall be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail to or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment because of such individual's ... sex .... " 
135. See infra notes 136, 137, 141. 
136. See, e.g., Meith v. Dothart, 418 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ala. 1976), rev'd sub nom., 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upheld an Alabama corrections regulation 
which permitted the state personnel department to exclude women from working as 
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ity137 and privacy138 have been used as a basis to limit female 
guards equal job opportunities. In Dothard v. Rawlinson,139 the 
Supreme Court denied a woman employment in an Alabama 
maximum security institution for fear that she would be raped 
by an inmate. Appellants' argument was based in part on the 
inmates' right to privacy.uo 
guards in male maximum security prisons on the basis of institutional security and pri-
vacy); Harden v. Dayton Human Rehabilitation Center, 520 F. Supp. 769, 781-82 (S.D. 
Ohio 1981) (rejected the existence of privacy rights as a defense to Title VII charge); 
Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979), aff'd, 612 
F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980) (administrative remedies 
available to adjust any infringement on male inmate's privacy rights in order to allow 
equal employment for female guards); Iowa Dept. of Soc. Servo V. Iowa Merit Emp. 
Dept., 261 N.W. 2d 161, 165 (Iowa 1977) (placing female guard in a capacity where she 
would conduct pat or strip searches on male inmates violated the inmates' constitutional 
right to privacy); Long V. California State Personnel Board, 41 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 116 
Cal. Rptr. 562 (1977) (because of adverse effects females may have on wards, being a 
male is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for being a chaplain in the facil-
ity); Reynolds V. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145, 151 (N.D. 1974) (selective work responsibilities 
among correctional officers is reasonable to ensure privacy of inmates and does not dis-
criminate against women). 
137. Institutional security was the decisive factor in Dothard, 433 U.S. 321, 336. The 
likelihood that incarcerated offenders would assault and rape women guards was seen as 
a threat to prison security. Thus, being male was a BFOQ to be a prison guard as permit-
ted by § 703(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). Under Title VII sex may be a 
bona fide criterion but only in very limited circumstances. See Weeks v. Southern Bell 
Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (employer must prove that he had reasonable 
cause to believe that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely 
and efficiently the duties of the job in order for sex to qualify as a BFOQ). The ruling in 
Dothard was the first enunciation by the court that each woman could not decide for 
herself whether to risk the potential consequence of taking a contact position within a 
prison. 433 U.S. at 336. 
Institutional security and privacy rights were also major factors in Long v. California 
State Personnel Board, 41 Cal. App. 3d 1000, 116 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1974), where the court 
looked at the consequences of no gender based discrimination in hiring a chaplain for a 
boys' correctional facility. The court found that hiring a female chaplain would necessa-
rily involve a loss of privacy rights for the boys since she would have a lot of contact with 
them; therefore, they couldn't be informal in their living quarters. Since she could not 
physically control them, she could be physically or sexually attacked by them. Therefore, 
she could not take the position of chaplain. Because a woman's security is not a bona 
fide rea~on for sex based discrimination, id. at 1013, the court looked to the interest of 
the state and prison administration. They found that the state interest was rehabilita-
tion, and if a boy/man raped a female chaplain, he was not being rehabilitated. The 
court also did not view the duty of an employer to refrain from discrimination based 
upon sex as requiring him to alter his facility or incur any costs just to suit the sex of the 
person involved. Id. at 1015. 
138. See Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D. Md. 1980) (male inmate's 
privacy rights violated by the assignment of female guards to posts where they could 
view him entirely in the nude); Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1973). 
139. 433 U.S. 321. 
140. Id. at 346 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
23
Hanson: Women Prisoners
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983
690 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:667 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall stated: 
It is strange indeed to hear state officials who for 
years have been violating the most basic princi-
ples of human decency in the operation of their 
prisons suddenly become concerned about inmate 
privacy. It is stranger still that these same offi-
cials allow women guards in contact positions in a 
number of non maximum security institutions, 
but strive to protect inmates' privacy in the pris-
ons where personal freedom is most severely re-
stricted. I have no doubt on this record that ap-
pellants' professed concern is nothing more than 
blatant discrimination. 1• 1 
The absurdity of the argument that women would be raped 
in men's prisons is apparent when "the proper response to inevi-
table attacks on both female and male guards is not to limit the 
employment opportunities ... but to take swift and sure puni-
tive action against the inmate offenders."142 Further, this desire 
to protect women from rape does not extend to women's prisons, 
where the chances of rape by male guards occurring within 
prison walls are far greater. The greatest irony is that at no time 
has a male guard brought a Title VII suit to assert his right to 
work in a women's institution. It appears that any advances in 
equal job opportunities for women guards or prisoners' rights in 
general are merely the result of decisions ensuring males equal 
job opportunities. 
The right to privacy and dignity in prison has also evolved 
from the assertion by both maleHs and femaleH4 prisoners that 
they have a right to avoid unwanted intrusions by guards of the 
opposite sex. When the prisoner asserts his or her right of pri-
vacy, the state then asserts the provisions of Title VII as a de-
fense. In Forts v. Ward,HII the court granted initial injunction, 
141. Id. See generally Comment, Sex Discrimination in Prison Employment: The 
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification and Prisoners' Privacy Rights, 65 IOWA L. REV. 
428 (1980); Note, Balancing Inmates' Right to Privacy with Equal Employment for 
Prison Guards, 4 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 243 (Summer 1978). 
142. 433 U.S. at 346 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
143. See, e.g., Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982); Bowling v. Enomoto, 
514 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Hudson v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890 (D. Md. 
1980); Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981). 
144. See supra notes 93-109 and accompanying text. 
145. 434 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
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reasoning that the strictures of Title VII do not mandate oppor-
tunities to "Peeping Toms". The court stated that since a prison 
must have continual staff surveillance even the most considerate 
male guard cannot avoid invading an inmate's privacy.146 The 
initial injunction, which banned males from all areas of the 
prison where the privacy of the women could be invaded, was 
the broadest order in the entire Forts litigation. When the dis-
trict court's decision was modified147 and men were allowed to 
guard the sleeping area at night, the appellate court gave greater 
weight to the right to equal employment. The court held the in-
mate's privacy interest while sleeping was not sufficient to im-
pair employment rights for male guards, provided the prisoners 
were given suitable sleepware.148 Therefore, on a hot, airless 
night, an inmate must wear a heavy "Dr. Denton pajama"-or 
other suitable sleepwear-if she does not want to be viewed in 
the nude.149 The court made it clear that any interest in privacy 
and dignity that the inmates have is carved out of the interest in 
job opportunity. 
The majority of cases, however, have balanced the individ-
ual's right to employment, without regard to his or her sex, 
against the inmate's right to privacy and have created selective 
work responsibilities among correctional officers.lllo In Forts, the 
male guards were enjoined from the living and infirmary ar-
eas.1II1 The court then articulated administrative steps,1II2 cre-
146. [d. at 949. 
147. 621 F.2d at 1217. 
148. [d. 
149. [d. at n.ll. 
150. See Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. at 1095; Gunther, 462 F. Supp. at 952, 957; 
Harden, 520 F. Supp. at 781. 
151. 471 F. Supp. at 1102. 
152. [d. at 1097. 
A directive was eventually promulgated entitled GUIDE-
LINES FOR ASSIGNMENT OF MALE AND FEMALE 
CORRECTION OFFICERS. The stated purpose of the direc-
tive was to: 
1. Maximize full employment opportunities regardless of sex. 
2. Minimize intrusion on individual privacy. 
3. Establish guidelines to accomplish both of the above stated 
goals. 
The directive established various guidelines which reveal the 
State's obvious awareness of the problems, and its concern for 
the appropriate resolution: 
1. Security staff members of the opposite sex to the inmate 
population are not to be permanently assigned to shower areas 
25
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ated by the prison, which would assure both the inmate's right 
of privacy and the government's interest in security. 
However, the balancing approach implemented at Bedford 
Hills is proving to be inadequate;l!!S thus, other remedies for sex-
ual harassment of women prisoners must be developed. The 
right to bodily privacy and dignity of female prisoners must be 
taken seriously.' "We must probe more deeply for the real 
causes-otherwise we continue blindly and blandly to place 
bandaids on cancerous sores. "1114 
V. CONCLUSION 
Women incarcerated in American prisons face a punishment 
beyond that imposed by the courts. They are systematically de-
graded by being forced to endure invasions of their personal dig-
nity and autonomy. They are coerced into sexual relationships 
with male guards, viewed in the nude, and sometimes raped and 
sexually abused by them. Some facilities have set up guidelines 
but those remedies do not effectively protect the prisoners;I!!!! 
they merely cover-up a deeply rooted social problem. Removing 
males from women's prisons is not "the" answer. Such action 
where one has to work in open view of showering inmates. 
2. Escort duty outside of a facility shall be performed only by 
officers of the saine sex as the inmates to be escorted. 
3. At least one officer of the same sex as the inmate population 
at a facility must be assigned to each housing block. 
4. No assignment is to be made requiring an officer to conduct 
strip frisks of inmates of the opposite sex. 
• * • • • • • 
7. Unless emergency conditions dictate otherwise, correction 
officers of the opposite sex shall announce their presence in 
housing areas to avoid unnecessarily invading the privacy of 
inmates of the opposite sex. 
However, Guideline 7, for valid security reasons, is not always 
honored. 
Id. See also Dawson v. Kenrick, 527 F. Supp. at 1317 (after finding an invasion of female 
inmate's privacy because male guards could peer into the women's cells at any time and 
view the prisoners, the court ordered defendants to submit a plan (like the one in Forts) 
to accommodate the prisoner's right to privacy). 
153. One guard at Bedford Hills, the institution involved in Forts, was recently in-
dicted for rape and official misconduct and another pled guilty to official misconduct. 
Inmates at other institutions continue to complain of sexual abuse by male guards. See 
supra notes 7, 11, and 116. 
154. BURKHART, supra note 7, at 144. 
155. See Appendix A infra, for state established guidelines regarding male guards in 
women's prisons. 
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will not eliminate the sexism and paternalism in women's pris-
ons that is characteristic of American society in general, but the 
analysis of the harassment in prisons due to their presence pro-
vides a theoretical base from which a remedy may spring.1II6 
There exists a right to bodily privacy. This right protects 
women prisoners from sexual harassment. The right to privacy 
lays the foundation for prisoners tq assert control over their sex-
ual integrity and dignity in prison. There is no justification for 
any diminution of that right. A prison may formulate rules and 
regulations necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the 
prison, but those objectives should never outweigh a prisoner's 
right to be free from sexual degradation. 
Laurie A. Hanson* 
156. Letter from Dr. Jan Mickish to Laurie Hanson (Sept. 17, 1982). 
* Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. The author would 
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SPECIAL TRAINING RESTRICTIONS 
O. MALE CO's 
Male officers may not be on duty without a 
female oOicer present; males may not search 
females. 
None 
Body searches done by female officers, if 
done by male officer, female must be 
present. Same sel: supervision. 
Men cannot do strip searches or obtain urine 
specimen. 
N/A 
Male C.O .• cannot conduct skin searches, 
transporting, urinalysis, and showers. 
Transporting and shaking down. Training for 
all CO's i. cooed. 
Cannot transport offgrounds without female 
staff; cannot pat/strip search; cannot staff' 
full shift in living unit without female staff. 
Male officers are not allowed in dorms or 
other areas where female offenders live 
without fomale CO's. 
Very little contact inside female compound. 
Males are used for security in the yard and 
for escort duty. Never alone in a housing 
unit. 
There mu.t be one female CO on duty at 
the same time 88 the male CO 
Male officers may not shakedown inmates. 
Also should not get self in "one on one" 
situation. 
Orientation training; annual 2-week training 
covers th is topic 
Males do not search or work in living areas. 
Male security officers are utilized at the 
control centers, the outer perimeter and to 
aid in disturbances. 
A male officer cannot transport a female 
(one on one), and male officers have limited 
888ignmenta in living areas. 
No restrictions; a training program being 
developed. 
Male. do not work without female on 
housing unit. 
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MICHIGAN: Huron Women only 9~c' None 
Valley 
Women's Facility 
MINNESOTA: Women Have 1 male Proper ways of handling self with women, 
Correct~ and currently there is a policy to not have 
tional Facility opposite sex in living units. 
MISSOURI: Co-correctional 20% None 
Chillicothe 
Correctional Center 
NEBRASKA: Center Women only 14% Male officers are not assigned to work in the 
for Women living units and cannot perform any type of 
searches on inmates or female visitors. There 
are no restrictions 88 to males becoming 
involved in physical restraint situations. 
NEW MEXICO: Women only 23% Must do all jobs same as female COs except 
Radium Springs for personal searches and long distance 
Center for transport. 
Women 
NEW YORK: Albion Women only & 73% Males must announce their presence in 
Correctional Facility co-correctional housing areas. Same sex officer must conduct 
strip frisks and accompany on outside trips. 
NEW YORK: Women only 33% No body searches by males and no male. 
Bedford Hills alone in living areas. 
Correctional Facility 
NORTH CAROLINA: Women only 25% Males are never alone with a resident, and 
Correctional Center don't conduct searches or man 8 dorm. 
NORTH DAKOTA: Segregated None N/A 
Penitentiary Not cooed 
OHIO: Reformatory Women only 30% Male CO's never permitted in sleeping areas 
for Women without an inmate-may assist as to 
restraining. 
OKLAHOMA: Mabel Women only 30% Male CO's will announce themselves before 
Bassett Correctional entering 8 dorm area. 
Center 
OREGON: Women's Women only No male CO's allowed. Male personnel must 
Correctional Center announce presence in living units. Cannot 
observe inmates in undressed state unless for 
a bona fide emergency; male staff not 
allowed to shake down females unless in 
emergency. 
PENNSYLVANIA: Women only 25% Males are not assigned to female housing 
State Correctional units, may not escort females by themselves, 
Institution and are not to place hands on inmates. 
SOUTH DAKOTA: Women only 0 The Penitentiary has received an OK for a 
Women's Correctional bona fide occupational qualification for 
Facility femal .. only in the women's facility. 
TENNESSEE: Prison Women only 35% Searching restrictions 
for Women 
TEXAS: Department Women only 29% Primarily men work pickets and outside; no 
of Corrections men are allowed in sleeping quarters. 
UTAH: ~omen's Women only 0 N/A 
facility 
VERMONT: Co-correctional 90% Must be accompanied by female officer at all 
Chittenden times in female areas. 
Community Correc-
tional Center 
VIRGINIA: Women only 20% Living quarters are not staffed by males. 
Correctional 
Center for Women 
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WASHINGTON: Women only 5O,}(, Pat .earches conducted by female staff when 
Purdy Treatment possible. 
Center 
WISCONSIN: Women only 33% Men are not permitted involvement in 
Taycheedah routine personal searches, bathroom 
Correctional Inst, 8upervision, etc. 
WYOMING: Women only 0 Provide special traDing for male officers in 
Women'. Center areu or transport, floor responsibilities. 




CALIFORNIA, 66% Have both male and female CO's; utilize 
PLEASANTON Fel female officers (or strip searches of female 
inmatea. 
ILLINOIS, ... For escorting officers, one male to 8 group of 
CHICAGO Fel women, never one to one. Strip searches by 
women only, 
LEXINGTON, Co·correctional 66% ... 
KENTUCKY Fel 
WEST VIRGINIA, 52% Male CO'. are not routinely permitted to pet 
ALDERSON Fel or strip search female inmates. 
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